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The inﬂuence of peer behavior on an individual’s choices has received renewed interest
in recent years. However, accurate measures of this inﬂuence are diﬃcult to obtain.
Standard reduced-form methods lead to upwardly biased estimates due to simultaneity,
common shocks, and nonrandom peer group selection. This paper describes a structural
econometric model of peer eﬀects in binary choice, as well as a simulated maximum
likelihood estimator for its parameters. The model is nonparametrically identiﬁed under
plausible restrictions, and can place informative bounds on parameter values under much
weaker restrictions. Monte Carlo results indicate that this estimator performs better
than a reduced form approach in a wide variety of settings. A brief application to
youth smoking demonstrates the method and suggests that previous studies dramatically
overstate peer inﬂuence.
1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that the behavior of individuals, especially young people, is
strongly inﬂuenced by the behavior of those around them. In recent years, economists
have shown renewed interest in the study of peer eﬀects, neighborhood eﬀects, and
other non-market social inﬂuences that have taken on the general name of “social in-
teraction eﬀects.” Theoretical treatments by researchers including Akerlof and Kranton
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1(2000), Becker and Murphy (2001), and Brock and Durlauf (2001a) have made substantial
progress in identifying the implications of social interaction eﬀects for aggregate behavior.
In comparison, the state of empirical knowledge on social interaction eﬀects has ad-
vanced much more slowly. While there is a long history of empirical work on social inter-
actions, an inﬂuential article by Manski (1993) identiﬁes serious methodological problems
in the bulk of the literature. He notes that the simple reduced-form relationship between
an individual’s choices and those in his or her social group is a result of three distinct
eﬀects. A person’s choices can be directly inﬂuenced by either the choices (what Manski
calls “endogenous social eﬀects” or simply “endogenous eﬀects”) or characteristics (what
Manski calls “contextual eﬀects”) of those in his or her social group. In addition, there
may be what Manski calls “correlated eﬀects”, in which individuals in a social group ex-
hibit similar behavior because of common unobserved factors. Correlated eﬀects can arise
through simultaneity, nonrandom group selection, or common shocks. While endogenous
eﬀects, contextual eﬀects, and correlated eﬀects have very diﬀerent policy implications,
Manski demonstrates that standard methods are unable to distinguish between them.
In response to this critique, several more recent studies have developed new methods of
addressing at least some of these problems using experimental data, instrumental vari-
ables, and other identiﬁcation strategies. While these newer methods are a signiﬁcant
improvement over a reduced form analysis, each has signiﬁcant limitations as well.
This paper proposes a structural approach to the estimation of endogenous social ef-
fects that does not require experimental data or an instrumental variable, can be applied
to commonly available survey data, and is nonparametrically identiﬁed under reasonable
and transparent identifying restrictions. In addition, the estimation method provides
several avenues for placing informative bounds on parameter values under weaker re-
strictions than those needed for point identiﬁcation. The econometric model is based on
Brock and Durlauf’s (2001a) treatment of binary choice with endogenous social eﬀects,
but adds several features to account for correlated eﬀects as well. Selection and common
shocks are addressed by allowing both observable and unobservable characteristics to be
2correlated across peer group members. Simultaneity is addressed by treating peer choice
as an endogenous variable. This equilibrium-based structural approach produces a log
likelihood function which involves a series of high-dimensional integrals, so the model is
estimated by simulated maximum likelihood.
Nonparametric identiﬁcation in the model is achieved through a restriction on the cor-
related eﬀects. In the baseline version of the model it is assumed is that the within-group
correlation in unobservable variables is equal to the correlation in observable variables.
This “equal correlation” restriction, analogous to one introduced by Altonji, Elder, and
Taber (2000) to model selection issues in their analysis of Catholic school eﬀects, will
hold on average if the observable variables represent a random subset of the relevant
variables. In addition to providing point estimates under the equal correlation restric-
tion, techniques developed in this paper can also be used to ﬁnd informative bounds on
parameter values under much weaker restrictions on the correlated eﬀect.
The model can be estimated from either individual-based random samples or group-
based samples. Monte Carlo results indicate that the estimator performs well in moder-
ately sized samples of either type, and is not highly sensitive to several potential forms
of misspeciﬁcation. As a result, the estimator developed here can have wide empirical
applicability in the estimation of social interaction eﬀects. A brief empirical example,
on close friend inﬂuences in youth smoking, demonstrates one of these applications. Al-
though a full analysis of social interaction eﬀects in youth smoking is beyond the scope
of this paper, the results suggest that friends are substantially less inﬂuential than would
be implied by a reduced form analysis and that the application of structural estimation
to the question of peer inﬂuence in youth smoking merits further investigation.
1.1 Related literature
The contemporary empirical literature dealing with social inﬂuences on individual choice
starts from Manski’s (1993) critique of what had until that point been the dominant
3mode of empirical analysis in that literature. In these early studies, social inﬂuences
were measured using simple reduced form methods and standard survey data. A typi-
cal regression would include the respondent’s choice as the dependent variable, and the
respondent’s characteristics as well as the average choice within the respondent’s social
group as explanatory variables. The coeﬃcient on the reference group average choice
would then be interpreted as measuring the endogenous social eﬀect. Alternatively, the
reference group average of one or more background characteristics would be used as the
explanatory variable rather than the group average choice, in which case the coeﬃcient
would be interpreted as a contextual eﬀect. Manski’s critique of this approach is that
the actual parameters of interest are not identiﬁed: the reduced form coeﬃcient can be
interpreted as an endogenous, contextual, or correlated eﬀect, or some combination.
Moﬃtt (2001) explains the importance of distinguishing between these three eﬀects.
First, both endogenous and contextual eﬀects imply that groups matter, i.e., an individ-
ual’s social group memberships inﬂuence his or her choices. Second, endogenous eﬀects
imply a “social multiplier,” i.e., the aggregate eﬀect of a policy intervention will be larger
than the individual-level direct eﬀect. If strong enough, endogenous eﬀects may also
imply multiple group-level equilibria. If groups matter or if there are large social multi-
pliers, then evaluation of various social policies should consider their indirect eﬀects via
the social network in addition to their direct eﬀects. In addition, policies such as housing
mobility programs (Katz, Kling and Liebman 2001) depend on the existence of strong
endogenous or contextual eﬀects to be eﬀective. Contextual eﬀects do not imply a social
multiplier, and correlated eﬀects imply neither that social groups matter nor that there is
a social multiplier. Manski’s critique thus implies that results from reduced form studies
of social interaction eﬀects have no useful policy implications.
In response to these issues, empirical researchers have pursued a number of iden-
tiﬁcation strategies. One stream of the literature (Kremer and Levy 2001, Sacerdote
2001, Katz et al. 2001) focuses on special cases where individuals are randomly assigned
to reference groups, so any correlated eﬀects due to selection are avoided. Lagged peer
4variables are used to avoid correlated eﬀects due to common shocks, and the coeﬃcient
on one or more peer characteristics is interpreted as a contextual eﬀect. Another stream
(Evans, Oates and Schwab 1992, Gaviria and Raphael 2001, Hoxby 2000, Ioannides and
Zabel 2002) looks for credibly exogenous sources of variation in peer characteristics, and
uses this exogenous variation as an instrumental variable for peer choices. If the variation
in group characteristics is truly exogenous, and there is no contextual eﬀect, this method
consistently estimates the endogenous eﬀect. A third stream (Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman 1996, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 2002, Topa 2001) uses structural
models to infer the magnitude of endogenous eﬀects from aggregate statistics such as
social multipliers or the variance in behavior across aggregates.
Each of these approaches has both advantages and limitations. Identiﬁcation strate-
gies based on random assignment avoid correlated eﬀects due to selection, but are only
applicable to a few special cases, including ﬁrst-year college roommates and government-
assisted housing, where a central authority conducts the group assignment. Identiﬁcation
using instrumental variables requires that the IV be both credibly exogenous and relevant
to the outcome. These standard requirements are particularly diﬃcult to meet in this
case because they imply the IV must be a group-level variable which aﬀects everyone
in the group except the respondent. As Brock and Durlauf (2001b) note, this means
that the IV must be the group average of some individual-level variable that does not
produce contextual eﬀects. Even in cases where such a restriction is plausible, it is likely
to be suﬃciently controversial that it would be desirable to corroborate the results under
alternative identiﬁcation schemes. Identiﬁcation using aggregate/structural approaches
often suﬀers from the problem that it is diﬃcult to evaluate how sensitive the results are
to the strong functional form assumptions made. All three approaches are in most cases1
able to distinguish between endogenous and contextual eﬀects only by assuming that one
or the other is absent.
The key advantage of the approach presented here is wider applicability than alter-
1One exception is Ioannides and Zabel (2002); see Section 2.2.
5native methods due to signiﬁcantly less demanding data requirements. Neither random
assignment nor exogenous variation in characteristics are required, and the model can
be estimated from standard survey data with either an individual-based or group-based
sample design. A related advantage is that these lower data requirements greatly fa-
cilitate the estimation of endogenous eﬀects within small and informal groups such as
close friends. All of the studies referenced above consider formally deﬁned groups such
as classrooms, schools, census tracts, college dorm rooms, etc., in part because their
identiﬁcation strategies are diﬃcult to apply to informal groups. Close friends may be
the most inﬂuential peers, so a full empirical understanding of social inﬂuences in behav-
ior requires the development of tools which can be used with both formal and informal
groups. This advantage comes with some associated limitations. First, as with most of
the literature, endogenous eﬀects are identiﬁed only under the assumption that there are
no contextual eﬀects. In addition, the approach described here faces two issues common
to structural models: some assumptions are strong and not necessarily testable, and the
computational cost and complexity of the estimator is far greater than for OLS or IV
methods. Unlike most structural approaches in the literature, however, the approach
developed here provides a number of techniques for analyzing the sensitivity of results to
critical assumptions.
2 The model
The econometric model is based on the standard model of binary choice with social
interactions formalized by Brock and Durlauf (2001a), with two substantive diﬀerences:
the size of the peer group is ﬁnite and there may be correlated eﬀects. Both of these
features are necessary for many empirical applications.
62.1 Preferences and choices
Individuals in the model are organized into a number of non-overlapping peer groups.
Groups are indexed by g and individuals are indexed within each group by i, so that
the pair (g,i) identiﬁes an individual. The size of group g is exogenous and given by ng.
Each individual makes a binary choice ygi ∈ {0,1}, and has a utility function ugi(ygi;yg)
such that:








is vector of exogenous characteristics which are observ-
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and gi is an exogenous term which is not observed in the data. The parameter γ ≥ 0
is the endogenous social eﬀect; if γ > 0 an individual’s incentive to choose ygi = 1 is in-
creasing in the fraction of his or her peers that do so. As with much of the literature, this
model assumes that there is no contextual eﬀect. Section 5.2 discusses the implications
of relaxing this assumption.
2.2 Correlated eﬀects
The three primary sources of correlated eﬀects are simultaneity, nonrandom group selec-
tion, and common shocks. The model accounts for correlated eﬀects due to simultaneity
by treating peer behavior as an endogenous variable. Correlated eﬀects due to nonran-
dom group selection and common shocks are introduced into the model2 by allowing for
2An alternative approach for accounting for selection into groups in a structural model would be to formally
model the selection process itself. This approach has proved useful in a number of applications such as the
selection of workers to ﬁrms (Heckman and Sedlacek 1985) and families to neighborhoods (Epple and Sieg 1999),
and has been used in the social interactions literature by Ioannides and Zabel (2002). These authors, following
a suggestion by Brock and Durlauf (2001b), estimate both endogenous and contextual neighborhood eﬀects in
housing demand by estimating neighborhood selection equations and constructing exogenous instruments for
neighbors’ housing demand using the neighbors selection correction term. While this approach has promise in a
number of applications, especially in estimating social interaction eﬀects at the neighborhood or school level, the
data requirements for estimating the selection equation are substantial. Identiﬁcation of the selection equation
is facilitated by the presence of ﬁxed and measurable neighborhood/school characteristics, a condition that is
7gi to be correlated across members of a given peer group. In particular, (using the case
ng = 3 as an example) the joint distribution of characteristics across group members is
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to ensure that the covariance matrix is positive deﬁnite.
In addition to the functional form restriction of joint normality, equation (2) places
several substantive restrictions on the model. Two of these restrictions are innocuous:
that the distribution is symmetric (since the ordering of group members is arbitrary),
and that the utility function has been normalized so that gi has mean zero and unit
variance. A more substantive restriction is that, as in the standard probit model, the
observable and unobservable terms are uncorrelated, i.e., cov(gi,βxgi) = 0. Potentially
more controversially but in the same spirit, it is also assumed that there is no correla-
tion between one group member’s observables and the unobservables of the other group
members, i.e., cov(gi,βxgj) = 0 for i 6= j. Section 5.2 brieﬂy discusses the implications
of nonzero correlation between observables and unobservables.
2.3 Equilibrium
Given the preferences of each agent, let Yg be the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria
of the normal form game deﬁned by players i ∈ {1,...,ng}, strategy space {0,1}ng and
not always met in a given application. The approach developed in this paper is complementary to approaches
built on more formal models of group selection, and has less demanding data requirements.
8payoﬀ functions that satisfy equation (1):
Yg ≡ {y ∈ {0,1}
ng : yi = 1 ⇔ ugi(1;y) − ugi(0;y) > 0 ∀i ∈ {1,2,...,ng}} (3)
The properties of Nash equilibria for this model follow closely from Milgrom and Roberts’
(1990) results on supermodular games. In particular, for any preference proﬁle, the set
of pure strategy Nash equilibria has a minimal and maximal value, and all rationalizable
strategy proﬁles, all (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria, and all correlated equilibria lie in
the interval [min(Yg),max(Yg)]. Equilibrium is unique for almost all preference proﬁles
if there is no endogenous eﬀect (γ = 0), and is nonunique for a positive (probability)
measure of preference proﬁles if there is an endogenous eﬀect (γ > 0) (Krauth 2001).
Multiplicity of equilibria complicates estimation, as uniqueness of the likelihood function
for equilibrium behavior requires the imposition of an equilibrium selection rule.
A selection rule is simply a function sel(y,Y ) which assigns a probability to each pure
strategy Nash equilibrium:
sel(y,Y ) ≡ Pr(yg = y|Yg = Y ) (4)
In order to describe a well deﬁned probability distribution, s must obey the constraints
sel(y,Y ) ≥ 0 and
P
y sel(y,Y ) = 1. In addition, the requirement that only pure strategy
Nash equilibria are selected implies the constraint (y / ∈ Y ) ⇒ (sel(y,Y ) = 0). Imposing a
selection rule pins down a unique likelihood function and, if correctly speciﬁed, produces
consistent point estimates of parameters. This paper will consider three speciﬁc selection
rules:
Low-activity equilibrium: sel(min(Y ),Y ) = 1 (5)
High-activity equilibrium: sel(max(Y ),Y ) = 1 (6)





#Y if y ∈ Y
0 if y / ∈ Y
(7)
More complex rules are also possible, and may be appropriate to a particular application.
Although a selection rule must be imposed to achieve point identiﬁcation, selection
rule free estimation methods are also available which identify bounds on the model pa-
rameters. Under some conditions, these bounds are informative. Section 4.2 describes
selection rule free estimation of the model.
2.4 Identifying restrictions on the correlated eﬀects
Although the model as speciﬁed is formally identiﬁed, there is no obvious nonparametric
means of distinguishing between correlated eﬀects (ρ) and endogenous eﬀects (γ). This
section outlines some plausible restrictions which facilitate nonparametric identiﬁcation.
Section 3.3 provides a heuristic argument for nonparametric identiﬁcation under such
restrictions.
2.4.1 Baseline restriction: Equal correlation
One plausible approach, which is used as the baseline identifying assumption in this
paper, is to use information in the data on ρx to provide a reasonable guess for ρ. In a
sense, this is already done informally: the reason why applied researchers are particularly
concerned about positive between-peer correlation in unobservables (which, after all, is
just another species of omitted variables bias) is that there is often ample evidence of
positive correlation in observable characteristics among peers. In general, a restriction
using information on ρx to restrict ρ would take the form ρ = f(ρx) for some known
function f.
In particular, the baseline restriction for this paper is that the two correlation coeﬃ-
cients are equal:
ρ = ρx ≡ ρ (8)
10The equal correlation assumption and its justiﬁcation are in the spirit of Altonji, El-
der, and Taber’s (2000, AET) work on the eﬀects of Catholic schools. The literature
on Catholic school eﬀects faces similar issues to the social interaction eﬀects literature:
although students in Catholic schools experience better outcomes on average than ob-
servationally similar students in public schools, it is diﬃcult to distinguish the eﬀect of
Catholic school from the eﬀect of unobserved characteristics which lead to both better
outcomes and increased probability of selecting a Catholic school. Their partial solution
to this identiﬁcation problem is to estimate a selection equation and outcome equation,
then use the correlation between the ﬁtted values in the two equations as a proxy for the
correlation between the unobserved terms.
The current setting is somewhat diﬀerent from that faced by AET, but much of their
intuition and argument can be adapted. Suppose that the incremental utility previously
deﬁned in equation (1) can alternatively be written as a linear function of a large set of
relevant variables:
ugi(1;yg) − ugi(0;yg) = ΓZgi + γ¯ ygi (9)
where Zgi is the complete vector of individual i’s relevant characteristics and Γ is a vector
of coeﬃcients. Now suppose that we randomly divide this large set of relevant variables
into an “observed” subset Zx
gi and an “unobserved” subset Z
gi. Let Γx and Γ be the
corresponding subvectors of Γ. Now suppose that we calculate the within-peer-group
correlations ρx ≡ corr(ΓxZx
gi,ΓxZx
gj) and ρ ≡ corr(ΓZ
gi,ΓZ
gj). Since the partition is
random
E(ρx) = E(ρ) (10)
where the expectations are taken across the distribution of possible random partitions.
The use of this argument to justify assuming ρx = ρ depends on two key elements.
First, the observed variables must be a random subset of the relevant variables, in the
sense that all relevant variables are observed with equal probability. Alternatively, one
might guess that characteristics more likely to be observed by an econometrician are also
11more likely to be observed by those forming peer groups, in which case ρx is actually an
upper bound for ρ. In that case, a lower bound can be placed on γ using the methodology
described in Section 4.1. Second, equation (10) only implies that the expected correlation
is the same for the observable and unobservable components, when expectations are taken
over the set of random subsets of variables. Equation (8) asserts equality in the realized
correlation for the particular set of variables observed in a given data set. All else being
equal, the appropriateness of this assumption will be greater in cases where the number
of explanatory variables is greater.
2.4.2 Alternative point restrictions
Alternatively, the model parameters are nonparametrically identiﬁed under any other
point restriction on either ρ or γ, including:
ρ = ρ∗ for some known ρ∗ (11)
γ = γ∗ for some known γ (12)
ρ = f(ρx) for some known function f(.) (13)
For example, in settings where the peer group is assigned through a random mechanism
(Sacerdote 2001) it may be reasonable to assume that ρ = 0. Alternatively, a researcher
may estimate ρ under the restriction γ = 0. The result will indicate how large the
correlated eﬀect must be to explain the data in the absence of an endogenous eﬀect; if
the implied correlation in unobservables is implausibly large (particularly in light of the
estimated correlation in observables ρx), this result could be interpreted as evidence in
favor of an endogenous eﬀect.
2.4.3 Interval restrictions
In most applications, the values of ρ and γ are not known in advance. However, one
may have reasonable conﬁdence in a particular upper or lower bound on ρ. For example,
12one may be conﬁdent that peer group members are at least as similar as would occur
under random group assignment (which implies ρ ≥ 0) or one may be conﬁdent that the
correlation in observable characteristics provides an upper bound on the correlation in
unobservables (which implies ρ ≤ ρx). Section 4.1 describes a method for constructing
consistent bounds on γ given bounds imposed on ρ. In some cases the resulting bounds
on γ can be informative even for very conservative restrictions on ρ.
3 Estimation
The econometric model is deﬁned by the utility function (1), the joint probability distri-
bution of the exogenous variables (2), the deﬁnition of equilibrium (3), and an equilibrium
selection rule, of which (5)-(7) are examples. In practice, the additional restriction (8),
or some alternative restriction on ρ, will also be imposed.
The model can be estimated using data with either an individual-based or group-based
sampling design, though many details of the estimation method vary with the type of
data. An individual-based sample (Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 2000, Evans et
al. 1992, Katz et al. 2001) is just a standard random sample of individuals, with data on
peer behavior either reported directly by the respondents or derived from some separate
aggregate3 data source such as Census tract data. Group-based samples have been used
frequently in the social interactions literature (Gaviria and Raphael 2001, Hoxby 2000,
Kremer and Levy 2001, Sacerdote 2001), and are constructed by sampling a number of
individuals within each of a set of randomly sampled groups. Data on peer behavior
is derived from the peers’ own self-reports, provided that the group identiﬁcation of
3One practical constraint on the estimator developed in this section is the size of peer groups. In principle,
the estimator described here can be used with peer groups of any size, and that size can vary across the groups
within a data set. In practice, the computational cost of the estimator increases with the size of the peer group,
which may make simulation-based estimation of this model impractical for extremely large peer groups (Census
tracts, cities, etc.). Fortunately, the model can still be estimated, and the estimation method is actually much
simpler. Krauth (2004) shows that as the group size increases, a close approximation of the likelihood function
can be calculated directly without use of simulation. Standard maximum likelihood methods can then be
applied.
13each individual is provided in the data. In addition to providing information on the
binary choice of each respondent and the average choice in each peer group, the data
set must include at least some of each respondent’s relevant background characteristics.
In addition to these two main cases, the model and estimation methods described here
could also be adapted in a conceptually straightforward manner to handle richer data
with detailed social network information or multiple levels of reference groups, subject to
a few application-driven modeling decisions on the covariance structure of the exogenous
variables.
3.1 ML and SML estimation
Consider a data set of N individuals (if an individual-based sample) or N groups (if a
group-based sample), and index observations by g = 1,...,N. In a group-based sample,
both xgi and ygi are observed for all group members. In an individual-based sample, xgi
and ygi are observed for the respondent only, as well as the proportion or number of other
group members for whom ygi = 1.
Let yg be deﬁned as in Section 2. Note that the index of an individual within the
group is arbitrary. For ease of notation, let the respondent4 in an individual-based sample






xg1 if an individual-based sample
 
xg1,xg2,...,xgng
0 if a group-based sample
The data set is thus {(Xg,yg)}N
g=1.
Let θ0 = (β,γ,ρx,ρ,µ,σ) be the true parameter vector, let Θ ⊂ Rk+6 be the feasible
4With a true random sample and peer groups of ﬁxed size, the probability that two randomly sampled
individuals will be in the same peer group goes to zero as the population size goes to inﬁnity. In practice, there
may be applications where deviations from true random sampling leads to multiple observations within a given
group. This case can be treated as just a special case of the group-based sample with exogenously censored
elements of xg.
14parameter space5 for θ0, and let θ be an arbitrary element of Θ. The model deﬁned in
Section 2 implies that, for any θ, it is possible to calculate the conditional probability of












While Pr(Xg;θ) can be calculated analytically from the multivariate normal PDF, direct
calculation of Pr(yg,Xg;θ) is infeasible as it requires the evaluation of a complex mul-




s=1 be an unbiased simulator for Pr(yg|Xg;θ), i.e., a sequence of S inde-
pendent random variables such that E(Ps
g(θ)) = Pr(yg|Xg;θ). The simulated maximum

















Proposition 1 (Consistency of SML estimator) If θ0 is identiﬁed, then θSML is a
consistent estimator of θ0








g(θ)) = Pr(yg|Xg;θ). By Proposition 3.1 in Gouri´ eroux
and Monfort (1996), this implies that θSML is a consistent estimator of θ0. 2
5Note that µ and σ are not free parameters, as µ = E(βx) and σ2 = V ar(βx). As a result, the implemen-
tation of this estimator saves signiﬁcant computational time by using a two step (LIML) estimator in which µ
is replaced by β¯ x and σ is replaced by βΣxβ0 where Σx is just the standard variance/covariance matrix of the
x’s.
153.2 Simulation methodology
This section outlines two methods for generating Ps
g(θ), both of which are based on the
Geweke, Hajivassiliou, and Keane (GHK) algorithm. The GHK simulator is described
by Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud (1996), and was found to be the most robust and
accurate among numerous techniques compared by those researchers.
Let c ∼ N(M,Σ) be a random vector of length n, let χ be any subset of Rn
which can be expressed as the union of a ﬁnite collection of disjoint rectangles6, and
let ξ be a vector of n independent U(0,1) random variables. The GHK simulator is a
function GHK such that E(GHK(M,Σ,χ,ξ)) = Pr(c ∈ χ). The typical application





s=1 GHK(M,Σ,χ,ξs). to estimate Pr(c ∈ χ). In the course of calculating GHK(.),
the GHK algorithm also calculates a random vector ghk(M,Σ,χ,ξ) ∼ c|c ∈ χ. Proposi-
tion 2 below derives two methods for using these two functions to estimate Pr(yg|Xg;θ).










γ if γ > 0
βxgi + gi if γ = 0
Let Y (c) be the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria when cg = c. Then:
1. The set c(y) ≡ {c : y ∈ Y (c)} is a rectangle.
2. The set C(Y ) ≡ {c : Y = Y (c)} can be expressed as the union of a ﬁnite collection
of disjoint rectangles.
3. The conditional distribution cg|Xg is multivariate normal with mean Mg and co-
6A rectangle is a set which can be deﬁned as χ = {X ∈ Rn : aχ ≤ X ≤ bχ} for some pair of vectors
aχ,bχ ∈ (R ∪ {−∞,∞})n











































































































for a group-based sample.
4. Let ξs be a vector of ng independent random variables from the standard uniform





sel(yg,Y )GHK(Mg,Σg,C(Y ),ξs) (16)
or let the “GHK-frequency hybrid simulator” be given by:
Ps
g(θ) ≡ sel(yg,Y (ghk(Mg,Σg,c(yg),ξs))GHK(Mg,Σg,c(yg),ξs) (17)







Proof: A constructive proof for each part of the proposition is provided in the appendix.
Proposition 2 deﬁnes two alternative methods for estimating Pr(yg|Xg;θ). The full
GHK simulator calculates the set C(Y ) in terms of a ﬁnite union of disjoint rectangles,
uses the GHK simulator to estimate the probability of each rectangle, and then adds
up (with weights given by sel(yg,Y )) across all Y . It inherits the GHK simulator’s
useful properties of low variance, as well as continuity and diﬀerentiability. Its primary
drawback is that the number of rectangles in C(Y ), and thus the computational cost,
17grows rapidly in ng. The GHK-frequency hybrid uses the GHK simulator on the single
rectangle c(yg) to accurately estimate the probability that yg is a Nash equilibrium. As a
side eﬀect, the GHK simulator generates a random cg such that yg is a Nash equilibrium;
that random cg is used for a simple frequency simulator to estimate the probability that
yg will actually be observed given that it is a Nash equilibrium. The GHK-frequency
hybrid simulator has the advantage over the full GHK simulator that its computational
cost does not grow rapidly in ng, because only one rectangle probability is calculated
per observation. Its primary disadvantages are that it has a somewhat higher variance
than the full GHK simulator and is discontinuous in θ. This discontinuity complicates
maximization of the resulting likelihood function, as standard methods do not work well
with a discontinuous function (Gouri´ eroux and Monfort 1996, p. 96). Based on these
characteristics, it is recommended that the full GHK simulator be used if peer groups
are relatively small (ng ≤ 8), with the GHK-frequency hybrid used for data sets with
larger groups. For purposes of demonstrating both methods, the Monte Carlo results in
Section 5.2 are calculated using the full GHK simulator for individual-based samples and
the GHK-frequency hybrid for group-based samples.
The computer code implementing the estimation method is available from the au-
thor. The implementation of the GHK simulator is adapted from Vassilis Hajivassiliou’s
GAUSS code, and optimization is done by either a BFGS-Brent optimization routine writ-
ten by Bo Honor´ e and Ekaterini Kyriazidou (for the full GHK simulator) or a simulated
annealing routine written by William Goﬀe (for the GHK-frequency hybrid simulator).
As is generally the case in simulation-based estimation, the matrix of pseudorandom
numbers used in the simulator is kept constant through the entire estimation procedure.
In order to minimize simulation error, the pseudorandom numbers are derived from ran-
domized Halton sequences (Train 2002, Bhat 2003).
183.3 Identiﬁcation
This section provides a heuristic argument that the model is nonparametrically identiﬁed.
Nonparametric identiﬁcation is a key issue in applications of structural models such as
the one presented here. If the structural parameters are identiﬁed strictly as a result of
arbitrary functional form assumptions rather than through economically substantive and
justiﬁable restrictions, the model has little empirical usefulness.
The fundamental source of identiﬁcation in this case is the treatment of both the
respondent’s choice (ygi) and that of his or her peers (¯ ygi) as endogenous. Consider
two conditional expectation functions, E(ygi|xgi, ¯ ygi) and E(¯ ygi|xgi,ygi), which can in
principle be estimated from the data. First, the relationship between an individual’s
characteristics and his or her choice, i.e.,
∂E(ygi|xgi,¯ ygi)
∂xgi is increasing in β, thus identify-
ing that vector of parameters. The relationship between an individual’s choice and the
average choice of his or her peers, i.e.,
∂E(ygi|xgi,¯ ygi)
∂¯ ygi , is increasing in both ρ and γ. This
is exactly the identiﬁcation problem described by Manski (1993), and is the reason why
one or another of the restrictions discussed in Section 2.4 is needed to provide nonpara-
metric identiﬁcation. Once such a restriction is made, γ is identiﬁed. With group-based
data, the correlation in observables ρx is identiﬁed directly by the corresponding sample
moment.
With individual-based data, the identiﬁcation of ρx is more complex. It is identiﬁed
from the relationship between an individual’s characteristics and the average choice of
his or her friends β
∂E(¯ ygi|xgi,ygi)
∂xgi , which is increasing in ρx. To gain intuition for this,
consider the following numerical example and estimation by a simple indirect inference
scheme. The example features a simulated data set of 100,000 with the same parameter
settings as in the baseline model of Section 5. To facilitate comparison across diﬀerent
simulations, the matrix of pseudorandom variables used to generate the simulations is
ﬁxed across trials. Based on a given Monte Carlo sample, deﬁne two reduced form
coeﬃcients: let ˆ ψ be the coeﬃcient on ¯ y in a naive probit regression of y on x and ¯ y,
19and let ˆ ω be the coeﬃcient on yβx from an OLS regression of ¯ y on (y,yβx,(1 − y)βx).
Since these are random variables it is also convenient to deﬁne ψ(ρ,γ) ≡ E( ˆ ψ;ρ,γ)
and ω(ρ,γ) ≡ E(ˆ ω;ρ,γ). Now, suppose that we were to attempt to recover ρ and γ
from the reduced-form coeﬃcients ˆ ψ and ˆ ω. Based on the simulation described above, I
estimate that ψ(0.25,0.5) ≈ 1.511 and ω(0.25,0.5) ≈ 0.0132. Also using the simulated
data, but with diﬀerent parameter values, Figure 1 shows the set of all (ρ,γ) pairs such
that ψ(ρ,γ) ≈ 1.511 (the downward-sloping curve) and the set of all pairs such that
ω(ρ,γ) ≈ 0.0132 (the upward-sloping curve). These two curves intersect at only one
point: (0.25,0.5). Not only does this explanation provide some insight into the usefulness
of the common-correlation assumption, it suggests an explanation for another apparent
feature of the estimator. The Monte Carlo experiments suggest that the accuracy of ˆ γ
is closely related to the explanatory power of the exogenous variables, var(βx). In the
context of Figure 1, this can be explained by high variance in ˆ ω when var(βx) is low.
4 Extensions
4.1 Estimation with alternative restrictions on ρ
Although the baseline model’s assumption of equal correlation in observables and unob-
servables is reasonable in some applications, an empirical researcher may wish to estimate
under alternative restrictions. For point restrictions of the form (11), (12), or (13), es-
timation is simply a matter of optimizing the simulated log-likelihood function with the
appropriate constraint substituted for the equal-correlation restriction (8).
It is also possible, as suggested in Section 2 to place bounds on γ under interval
restrictions on ρ. The method for doing this is straightforward. Let the function ˆ γ(ρ∗)
be deﬁned as the ML estimate of γ under the restriction that ρ = ρ∗. Two things
should be noted about ˆ γ(.). First, ˆ γ(ρ)
p
→ γ, where ρ and γ are the true parameter
values. Second, because the log-likelihood function is continuous in θ, the Maximum
20Theorem implies that ˆ γ(.) is also continuous. This continuity suggests that a researcher
can calculate ˆ γ(.) at a ﬁnite number of points and interpolate between these points.
Now, suppose that one is willing to place an interval restriction on ρ and would like
to ﬁnd corresponding bounds on γ. The bounds can be deﬁned as follows:









In practice, it is simpler to report or graph ˆ γ(.) and allow the reader to choose a reasonable
interval restriction and construct the bounds. The application in Section 6 includes an
example.
4.2 Estimation without an equilibrium selection rule
It is also possible in some cases to learn something about parameter values without
imposing an equilibrium selection rule. There is a small literature (Jovanovic 1989, Tamer
2002b, Tamer 2002a) that explores identiﬁcation in models with multiple equilibria. The
key insight in the literature is that models with multiple equilibria imply interval rather
than point restrictions on conditional probabilities. Speciﬁcally, for an arbitrary choice
vector y, any selection rule must obey the condition:
Pr({y} = Yg) ≤ Pr(yg = y) ≤ Pr(y ∈ Yg) (19)
In other words, the probability of observing a particular outcome y will be at least as
large as the probability that it is the unique Nash equilibrium and no larger than the
probability that it is a Nash equilibrium. As Jovanovic notes, equation (19) deﬁnes a
family of likelihood functions, which includes the likelihood functions deﬁned by (5)-(7).
The set of parameter vectors which maximizes one or more of these likelihood functions
will by construction contain the ML estimate based on the unknown correct likelihood
function. In other words, although an equilibrium selection rule must usually be imposed
21to achieve point identiﬁcation7 of parameters, consistent bounds on parameters may be
constructed without imposing a selection rule.
The approach pursued in this paper is the “likelihood bounds” approach discussed
by Tamer (2002a). Let Hs
g(θ) be a random variable with the property that E(Hs
g(θ) =
Pr(yg ∈ Yg|xg;θ), and let Ls
g(θ) be a random variable with the property that E(Ls
g(θ)) =
Pr({yg} = Yg|xg;θ). The simulators used here are:
Hs
g(θ) ≡ GHK(Mg,Σg,c(yg),ξs) (20)
and either (full GHK simulator):
Ls
g(θ) ≡ GHK(Mg,Σg,C({yg}),ξs) (21)
or (GHK-frequency hybrid):
Ls
g(θ) ≡ I [Y (ghk(Mg,Σg,c(yg),ξs)) = {yg}]GHK(Mg,Σg,c(yg),ξs) (22)
where I[.] is the indicator function, and Mg,Σg,ξs, c(.), and C(.) are deﬁned as in Propo-
sition 2.
These estimated probabilities provide bounds on the set of likelihood functions that



















Regardless of the selection rule, the maximum of the true likelihood function must be
at least as great as `∗. This implies that the true maximum likelihood estimate θML is
7Tamer (2002b) shows that one can sometimes redeﬁne outcomes in such a way as to get point restrictions
on probabilities in this model without imposing a selection rule. However, his solution only works for the two
player case.























As the Monte Carlo results in Section 5.2 will show, V is sometimes but not always small
enough to provide informative bounds on parameter values. As Tamer (2002a) notes, V
does not provide sharp bounds on the parameter values because there are many functions
between the upper and lower bounds that are not valid log-likelihood functions.
Figure 2 shows this method graphically for three simulated data sets with diﬀerent
parameter values. The shaded area is the area of allowable likelihood functions con-
structed using Hs
g(θ) and Ls
g(θ). The horizontal dotted line marks the maximum of the
lower bounds `∗. The range of γ values in the set V is deﬁned by the dark line. As the
ﬁgure shows, the upper and lower bounds are identical for γ = 0 (because equilibrium is
almost always unique), and diverge as γ increases. As a result, V provides much narrower
bounds on ˆ γ when the true value of γ is lower.
4.3 Estimation with inconsistent reporting
In individual-based samples where the behavior of peers is reported by the respondent,
one issue that may appear is inconsistent reporting. For example, in the application
described in Section 6, the percentage of young people who self-report that they smoke
cigarettes is substantially lower than the average percentage of their four best friends that
they report as smokers. Because both the respondents and their friends are drawn from
the same population, this implies that they are either underreporting their own smoking,
overreporting their friends’ smoking, or both. This can be handled by extending the
model to incorporate inaccurate reporting. This section describes a simple example of
such an extension; richer models of reporting could be deﬁned as needed for applications.
The model of inconsistent reporting is based on three assumptions: individuals truth-
fully report the behavior of their peers ¯ ygi, truthfully report their own behavior when
23ygi = 0, and truthfully report their own behavior with some exogenous probability pr
when ygi = 1 . Let rgi be a binary variable indicating the behavior a person would
self-report in a survey. We suppose that
Pr(rgi = 1) =

     
     
0 if ygi = 0
pr if ygi = 1 and i = 1
1 if ygi = 1 and i 6= 1
(25)




and ﬁnd the parameter values which maximize a log-likelihood based on Pr(rg,Xg;θ,pr)
rather than Pr(yg,Xg;θ). Although pr can be estimated as part of the likelihood function,
it can also be estimated directly. Since pr = E(rg1)/E(¯ rg1), a natural estimator for pr is
just the ratio of the corresponding sample averages.
4.4 Estimation with aggregate variables
There are also many applications where some of the explanatory variables are aggregate
and apply to all group members, for example, prices, state or year ﬁxed eﬀects, school
characteristics, etc. These can be incorporated into the model by modifying the utility
function to include a vector of aggregate variables zg:
ugi(1;yg) − ugi(0;yg) = λzg + βxgi + γ¯ ygi + gi (26)
and proceeding as usual.
5 Monte Carlo experiments
This section applies the estimator developed in Section 3 to a series of simulated data
sets. The results provide an insight into the statistical performance of the estimator.
245.1 Overview of the experiments
Table 1 reports a selection of the Monte Carlo results. The baseline experiment has ob-
servations on 1,000 individuals, organized into 5-member peer groups. There is a single
x variable with a N(0,1) marginal distribution. The coeﬃcient on x is β1 = 1 and the
intercept is β0 = 0. Both the actual selection rule and the selection rule assumed in
estimating the model correspond to equation (5), the “low-activity” equilibrium. The
correlated and endogenous eﬀects take on one of three combinations: an endogenous
eﬀect with no correlated eﬀect (γ = 1,ρ = 0), a correlated eﬀect with no endogenous
eﬀect (γ = 0,ρ = 0.25), and both eﬀects (γ = 0.5,ρ = 0.25). Simulations are generated
with 1,000 observations, and both individual-based and group-based samples are gener-
ated. Once generated, the simulated data sets are used to estimate (1) a “naive” probit
model, in which peer behavior is treated as an exogenous explanatory variable, from the
individual-based sample, (2) the structural (SML) model estimated from the individual-
based sample, and (3) the structural (SML) model from the group-based sample. Table 1
reports the sample mean of key parameter estimates over 100 Monte Carlo samples, and
in some cases the sample standard deviation.
5.2 Results
Baseline: Rows 1-3 in Table 1 report the results from the baseline experiment. The
naive probit dramatically overestimates the true peer eﬀect in all three cases. Even when
ρ = 0.00, simultaneity produces an upwards bias of approximately 50%. In contrast, the
structural estimator eliminates both types of correlated eﬀect and comes very close to
the true parameter values on average. The only sign of nontrivial bias in the structural
estimates is for the case of γ = 0. Because γ = 0 is on the boundary of the allowed
parameter space, estimates of γ will have some upwards bias in any ﬁnite sample. This
issue also complicates hypothesis testing on the null of no peer eﬀect. In all cases, the
SML estimator clearly dominates the naive estimator.
25Alternative assumptions on x: Rows 4-6 provide information on how the prop-
erties of the explanatory variables matter. Row 4 shows results from a variation on the
baseline experiment in which the explanatory variables have low explanatory power for
the outcome, i.e., β1 = 0.1 instead of β1 = 1. As the table shows, this has minimal eﬀect
on the estimates from the group-based sample, but produces a substantial increase in
bias and variance for the individual-based sample. This is because ρx (and thus γ) is
identiﬁed in the individual-based sample from the eﬀect of xgi on ¯ ygi relative to its eﬀect
on ygi, as discussed in Section 3.3. When xgi has little eﬀect on ygi, the eﬀect is similar to
that of a weak instrument in IV estimation. Row 5 shows results from a variation on the
baseline experiment in which there are four explanatory variables (independent from one
another with a N(0,1) distribution) rather than just one. Because the previous experi-
ment revealed that explanatory power matters, the coeﬃcients on the x vector are set to
β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0.5 so that var(βx) of the model is unchanged from the baseline
experiment. As the table shows, this has little eﬀect on the estimates of ρ and γ. Row 6
shows the results froom a variation in which there are four binary explanatory variables.
Because the structural model assumes normally distributed explanatory variables, it is
slightly misspeciﬁed here in a way that is likely in applied work. As the results show,
this form of misspeciﬁcation has little eﬀect on the estimators.
Correlation between x and : Rows 7-10 report the results from simulations in
which there is correlation between observables and unobservables. As the results here
show, such a correlation will introduce a bias in the SML estimates. Whether the esti-
mated peer eﬀect is biased up or down appears to depend on two factors: whether the
sample is individual-based or group-based, and how large the within-group correlation is
relative to the individual-level correlation. At least in the cases presented here, the SML
estimator still does well relative to the naive estimator, though it obviously would be infe-
rior to some other estimator which is consistent under a correlation between observables
and unobservables.
26Wrong equilibrium selection rule: Rows 11-14 report the results from simula-
tions in which the equilibrium selection rule is misspeciﬁed by the researcher. In all four
cases, the estimates are calculated assuming that the low-activity equilibrium is already
selected. This type of misspeciﬁcation has minimal eﬀect on the resulting parameter
estimates, at least when the true selection rule falls within these three categories.
Selection rule free estimation: Rows 15-17 show results from selection rule free
estimation of the model as described in Section 4.2. In each of these three experiments,
the actual selection rule is the low-activity rule. The quantities reported are the median
(across 100 simulations) of the lower bound and upper bound estimates of γ. The median
is reported here because the distribution of estimated upper bounds has a strong positive
skew. As these results show, selection rule free estimation is able to provide informative
bounds on the endogenous eﬀect for the group-based sample (especially when the true
endogenous eﬀect is zero), but is less informative for the individual-based sample.
Contextual eﬀects: Rows 18-19 show the results when there is a contextual eﬀect
rather than an endogenous eﬀect. While both estimators mistakenly interpret at least
some of the contextual eﬀect as an endogenous eﬀect, the estimated peer eﬀect from an
individual-based sample has much lower bias. This appears to be in part because the
correlation in observables is being identiﬁed from the correlation between a respondent’s
characteristics and the average choice of his or her peers, so the contextual eﬀect produces
an upwardly biased estimate of ρ which then reduces the eﬀect on the estimated γ. In
estimating the model from a group-based sample, the contextual eﬀect has little impact
on the estimated ρ (note that the estimates are approximately correct), and so will not
reduce the bias in γ.
Inconsistent reporting: Rows 20-21 show the results for a case in which there
is inconsistent reporting of one’s own behavior and that of one’s peers, as modeled in
Section 4.3. In row 20, this inconsistent reporting is incorporated into the estimator,
and pr is estimated. In row 21, the inconsistent reporting is not incorporated into the
estimator (i.e., it is implicitly and incorrectly assumed that pr = 1). As the table shows,
27the parameter estimates are quite inaccurate when inconsistent reporting is not accounted
for, but accurate when it is.
6 Application: Youth smoking
This section provides a brief illustrative application to the estimation of close friend in-
ﬂuence on youth smoking. The decision of young people to smoke cigarettes is a natural
place to look for social interaction eﬀects. Smoking is a social activity, and one in which
many believe that peer inﬂuence is very strong, particularly among young people. In
addition, the decision to start smoking as a teenager has profound and life-long conse-
quences, and is thus a major concern for public health policy.
6.1 Background
The current consensus in the public health literature is that peers are critical inﬂuences
in the decision to start smoking. For example, Wang et al. (2000, p. 1241) state that the
“[s]moking literature has indicated that the inﬂuence of peers has been the single most
important factor related to smoking acquisition,” while Tyas and Pederson (1998, p.
416) report that “one of the most consistent ﬁndings in the literature is that of the social
inﬂuence of peers and others on adolescent smoking.” Unfortunately, this consensus is
built on exactly the type of methodologically ﬂawed research which has been criticized
by Manski (1993) and others.
Several recent papers (Norton, Lindrooth and Ennett 1998, Gaviria and Raphael 2001,
Powell, Tauras and Ross 2003) have used a simple IV method to estimate endogenous
social eﬀects in youth smoking at the classroom and/or neighborhood level. Although
their estimates of the endogenous eﬀect vary substantially, all three papers ﬁnd that the
bias in the naive estimator is actually negligible, i.e., there is no correlated eﬀect. This
ﬁnding is somewhat disconcerting, given that longitudinal data (Engels, Knibbe, Drop
and de Haan 1997, Wang, Eddy and Fitzhugh 2000) indicates that young smokers in
28low-smoking peer groups are likely to switch into higher-smoking peer groups over time.
Such behavior will tend to produce substantial correlated eﬀects, but the IV estimates
ﬁnd no evidence of them.
In addition to the methodological diﬀerences, the application presented here diﬀers
from the previous IV studies by investigating the inﬂuence of close friends rather than
larger and more formal groups. Estimates of close friend eﬀects appear frequently in the
public health literature on youth smoking (1995, 2002, 2003), but have been absent from
the economics literature.
6.2 Data
The data source is the 1993 Teenage Attitudes and Practices Survey (TAPS), an individual-
based survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to learn more about
the determinants of smoking and other risky behavior among U.S. teens. The outcome
variable is an indicator of whether the respondent is what the CDC deﬁnes as a “cur-
rent smoker” – someone who has smoked a cigarette in the past 30 days. The social
group is the respondent’s four best same-sex friends, and the measure of peer behavior
is the number of those friends that smoke, as reported by the respondent. In addition,
the TAPS provides standard background variables including race, age, parental smoking,
exposure to information about the risks of smoking, and participation in sports and reli-
gious services. Wang et al., (1995) also use this data to estimate (by the naive method)
close friend eﬀects on smoking. After dropping observations without information on the
endogenous variables, the sample has 8,192 respondents, all high-school age. The model
is estimated with the correction for inconsistent reporting described in Section 4.3. The
fraction of teens that admit to smoking is about 20%, while the average fraction of their
friends who smoke is about 27%. The estimated rate of truthful reporting by smokers is
thus ˆ pr = 0.20
0.27 = 0.74.
296.3 Results
Table 2 reports basic results. The ﬁrst column in the table displays coeﬃcient estimates
from a naive probit, while the second column shows SML parameter estimates for the
structural model. The naive probit results suggest a large endogenous social eﬀect (ˆ γ =
1.891). The structural model estimates imply a large correlated eﬀect (ˆ ρ = 0.621) and
thus a much smaller endogenous eﬀect (ˆ γ = 0.225).
Because the structural model includes the underreporting correction, the magnitudes
of the coeﬃcient estimates are not directly comparable in the two columns, nor are
they directly comparable with coeﬃcient estimates from other studies which use diﬀerent
functional forms. To characterize the results in a way that is comparable, consider a
representative individual, i.e one with observed characteristics such that his or her prob-
ability of being a self-reported smoker is equal to the average (0.20), and who has no
close friends who smoke. According to each model, by how many percentage points will
this representative individual’s probability of being a self-reported smoker increase if one
close friend becomes a smoker?
I calculate this quantity for both the naive model and the structural model, as well as
for other models estimated in the literature. In this paper, the naive model predicts an
increase in smoking probability by 16 percentage points (from 20% to 36%) as a result
of one friend becoming a smoker. The structural model structural model predicts an
increase in both actual and self-reported smoking of 1 to 2 percentage points. Previous
articles in the literature on close friend peer eﬀects, all of which use naive estimators,
ﬁnd even larger responses than the naive estimator here. Wang et al. (1995), also using
the TAPS data, ﬁnd that the probability of being a smoker increases by 37-53 percentage
points, depending on age. Lloyd-Richardson et al. (2002) ﬁnd that the probability of
being a smoker increases by 34 percentage points, and Norton et al. (2003) ﬁnd that it
increases by 18 percentage points. Clearly the basic estimates from the structural model
imply that close friends are less inﬂuential than previously thought.
30The starkness of this result is reduced but not eliminated when the equal correlation
assumption is relaxed. Figure 3 shows the results of relaxing this assumption, using the
methodology described in Section 4.1. The ﬁgure shows a number of results. First, even
if one imposes only the very weak restriction that peer groups exhibit at least as much
similarity as would be the case if they were constructed by random assignment (ρ ≥ 0),
the data indicate the peer eﬀect is lower than implied by the naive model. If one is willing
to impose the slightly stronger restriction that ρ ∈ [0.311,0.621] (i.e., the correlation in
unobservables is no more than the estimated correlation in observables, and no less than
half the estimated correlation in observables), then this restriction produces bounds of
approximately [0.000,0.909].
These results should be viewed as suggesting that close friend eﬀects on youth smoking
are weaker than implied by previous studies, rather than proving that close friend eﬀects
are near zero. There are some limitations in the TAPS data, particularly a lack of state
identiﬁers so that cigarette prices can be incorporated into the model. In addition, space
and scope limitations preclude a detailed analysis of the data here. Ongoing research
applies the methodology developed here to richer data sets on youth smoking. and with
more detailed analysis. The results here clearly merit further investigation.
7 Conclusion
Many economists are skeptical of the empirical importance of social interaction eﬀects
and suspect that their magnitude has been overstated by researchers who fail to account
for correlated eﬀects. Researchers have made some progress on this issue recently, but
each of the main approaches in the literature has signiﬁcant limitations. The approach
developed here does not require centralized manipulation of the economic environment to
generate experimental data, nor does it require the existence of a suitable instrumental
variable. Instead, it merely requires standard survey data with some information on
peer behavior. Although the estimation method itself is somewhat complex, a complex
31research design is not required. The available computer code can simply be applied to
the data as a direct substitute for the naive estimator. This feature is important in a
world where policy-oriented researchers, needing a point estimate for the peer eﬀect in
a given situation, will use the naive estimator if all of the alternatives require complex
research designs.
Several avenues for further research remain, in addition to empirical applications. An
ongoing research project investigates social interaction eﬀects in youth smoking in more
detail. While much remains to be done, the results here indicate that simulation-based
structural estimation can be a valuable tool in the empirical analysis of social interactions.
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34SML Estimator
Actual Naive Sample of Sample of
Values Probit Individuals Groups
Description γ ρ ˆ γ ˆ γ ˆ ρ ˆ γ ˆ ρ
Baseline 1.0 0.00 1.525 0.996 0.001 1.032 -0.003
(0.176) (0.181) (0.044) (0.145) (0.020)
0.5 0.25 1.489 0.514 0.243 0.495 0.248
(0.154) (0.160) (0.050) (0.163) (0.034)
0.0 0.25 0.834 0.067 0.233 0.065 0.238
(0.155) (0.087) (0.032) (0.091) (0.028)
Alternative assumptions on X:
Low explanatory power 0.5 0.25 1.818 0.795 0.139 0.497 0.247
(β1 = 0.1) (0.134) (0.573) (0.230) (0.157) (0.032)
Multiple X’s (k = 4) 0.5 0.25 1.489 0.485 0.255 0.467 0.254
(0.159) (0.156) (0.051) (0.143) (0.034)
Binary X’s. (k = 4) 0.5 0.25 1.467 0.443 0.268 0.448 0.258
(0.152) (0.172) (0.053) (0.153) (0.030)
Correlation between X and :
ρ(βxgi,gi) = 0.2, ρ(βxgi,gj) = 0.0 0.5 0.25 1.390 0.588 0.200 0.442 0.260
ρ(βxgi,gi) = 0.2, ρ(βxgi,gj) = 0.05 0.5 0.25 1.572 0.686 0.239 0.633 0.253
ρ(βxgi,gi) = 0.2, ρ(βxgi,gj) = 0.1 0.5 0.25 1.804 0.809 0.275 0.845 0.246
Wrong equilibrium selection rule:
Actual = High-activity 1.0 0.00 1.453 0.891 0.011 0.955 -0.006
0.5 0.25 1.477 0.513 0.242 0.444 0.257
Actual = Random 1.0 0.00 1.517 0.974 0.001 0.976 -0.001
0.5 0.25 1.482 0.485 0.253 0.475 0.250
Selection rule free estimation:
Median[Lower bound,Upper bound] 1.0 0.00 [0.145,> 4.0] [0.388,2.706]
0.5 0.25 [0.082,> 4.0] [0.177,1.537]
0.0 0.25 [0.037,3.566] [0.001,0.073]
Contextual eﬀects:
u(1) − u(0) = 1.0xgi + 0.5¯ xgi + gi 0.0 0.25 1.222 0.108 0.367 0.379 0.221
0.0 0.00 0.489 0.111 0.088 0.368 -0.016
Inconsistent reporting:
pr = 0.5, correction made 0.5 0.25 0.678 0.499 0.252
pr = 0.5, no correction 0.5 0.25 0.678 -0.003 0.308
Table 1: Monte Carlo results. Calculated using 100 trials; see text for details.
35Variable Naive SML
Description Probit Estimator
Peer correlation (ρ) – 0.621
– (0.087)






Age (years) 0.073 0.134
(0.017) (0.032)
Parental smoking 0.102 0.273
(0.037) (0.040)
Taught risks in class -0.043 -0.176
(0.044) (0.040)
Plays sports -0.152 -0.301
(0.037) (0.043)
Attends religious services -0.203 -0.458
(0.037) (0.052)
Table 2: Regression results for teen smoking data. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors for SML estimates are estimated from 50 bootstrap replications.
36Figure 1: The upward-sloping curve is the set of (ρ,γ) pairs such that ˆ ω = 0.0132. The
downward-sloping curve is the set of (ρ,γ) pairs such that ˆ ψ = 1.511. Because these two
curves intersect at only one point, these two relationships provide identiﬁcation.
Figure 2: Mechanics of selection rule free estimation via likelihood bounds. All likelihood
functions consistent with Nash equilibria lie within shaded area; dotted lines provide lower and
upper bounds on peer eﬀect γ. Graphs depict cases (ρ,γ) = (0,1), (0.25,0.5), and (0.25,0.0),
respectively.
37Figure 3: Results for teen smoking data which can be used to place bounds on social interaction
eﬀects. The individual points represent the point estimates from both the naive probit model
and the structural SML model with the equal correlation restriction. The ellipse around the
structural model estimate is an approximate 95% conﬁdence region. The solid line represents
the ˆ γ(ρ) function described in the text, and the shaded region is a pointwise asymptotic 95%
conﬁdence band for that function.
38A Additional not-for-publication notes
A.1 Proof for Proposition 2
Proof: (1) We can simply construct the rectangle. Let:
cgi =
(









j6=i ygj if ygi = 1
∞ if ygi = 0




and ¯ cg =
 
¯ cg1,¯ cg2,...,¯ cgng
0 Then c(y) = [cg,¯ cg] ≡ {c ∈






[c(y),¯ c(y)] if y ∈ Y
[c(y),¯ c(y)]c if y / ∈ Y
!
Next, note that if A = [aL,aH] and B = [bL,bH] are both rectangles in Rn, then A∩B =
[aL ∨ bL,aH ∧ bH] is also a rectangle. In addition, if A is a rectangle, then Ac can be























It follows that if A and B are rectangles then Ac∩B and Ac∩Bc can be expressed as the
union of a ﬁnite collection of disjoint rectangles. Therefore, C(Y ) can be expressed as
the union of a ﬁnite collection of disjoint rectangles. (3) follows from standard theorems
on the conditional and marginal distribution of a linear function of a multivariate normal








sel(yg,Y )Pr(cg ∈ C(Y )|Xg;θ)






C(Y )|Xg;θ), the full GHK simulator (16) is consistent. The probability can also be
written as:
Pr(yg|Xg;θ) = Pr(yg|yg ∈ Yg,Xg;θ)Pr(yg ∈ Yg|Xg;θ)











→ Pr(yg ∈ Yg|Xg;θ), the
GHK-frequency hybrid simulator (17) is also consistent. 2
39A.2 Details on the “binary characteristics” Monte Carlo
experiment
The “Binary Characteristics” experiment is complicated by there being many ways to
generate a vector of binary variables with a particular mean vector and covariance matrix.
The particular method used is as follows. For each explanatory variable v and each group
g, there is a group-speciﬁc probability pv











2 with probability 1/2
(28)
Conditional on pv
g, each group member’s characteristic xv
gi is an independent draw from
the Bernoulli(pv
g) distribution. Given these assumptions, E(xv
gi) = p and corr(xv
gi,xv
gj) =
ρ. In order to keep the explanatory power of x the same as the baseline experiment, the
coeﬃcients are set so that E(βxg1) = 0 and var(βxg1) = 1. Speciﬁcally, p = 0.5, β1 =
β2 = β3 = β4 = 1, and β0 = −2. As usual, the vector of unobservables is multivariate
normal with zero mean, unit variance, and correlation ρ across group members.
A.3 Details on comparison of previous studies
Because of diﬀerences in estimation methods across studies, and diﬀerences in standard
reporting methods between researchers in health and in economics, some degree of sub-
jective interpretation is involved. This section describes how each paper was interpreted
to generate the estimates reported in Section 6.
Wang et al. (1995)
1. Data: Youth age 14-18 in the U.S. Teenage Attitudes and Practices Survey.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of four same-sex best friends (0 smokers vs. 1-2
smokers vs. 3-4 smokers).
3. Method: Logistic regression, separately for each age, odds ratios reported.
4. Estimates: Odds ratio of 1-2 smokers vs 0 smokers among peers varies from 5.3
(Table 1, column 3) to 10.7 (Table 1, column 2). Therefore logit coeﬃcient (on
dummy variable “1-2 smokers among friends”) varies from 1.67 to 2.37. Eﬀect of
an increase in best-friend smoking from zero to one is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Λ(Λ−1(0.2) + 1.67) − 0.2
= 0.37
∆Pr(y = 1) = Λ(Λ−1(0.2) + 2.37) − 0.2
= 0.53
Lloyd-Richardson et al. (2002)
1. Data: Grade 7-12 students in the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent
Health.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate among 3 best friends.
403. Method: Logistic regression, odds ratios reported.
4. Estimates: Odds ratio for 1 peer who smokes vs. 0 peers who smoke was 4.68 (Table
2, column 2), implying logit coeﬃcient of ln(4.68) = 1.543. Eﬀect of a one person
increase in best friend smoking is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Λ(Λ−1(0.2) + 1.543) − 0.2
= 0.34
Norton, et al. (2003)
1. Data: Grade 9 students in a North Carolina study.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of 3 best friends.
3. Method: Linear probability model. The researchers also included perceived smoking
of peers (as distinct from their actual smoking) as an explanatory variable.
4. Estimates: LPM coeﬃcient is 0.526 (Table 1, column 1). Eﬀect of a one-person
increase in peer smoking is :
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.526 ∗ 0.33
= .18
Krauth (current article)
1. Data: Youth age 14-18 in the U.S. Teenage Attitudes and Practices Survey.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of four same-sex best friends.
3. Method: Naive probit, structural estimator.
4. Estimates: Naive probit coeﬃcient 1.891; structural coeﬃcient estimates ˆ γ = 0.225,
ˆ pr = 0.74. Eﬀect of a one-person increase in close-friend smoking predicted by naive
model is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Φ(Φ−1(0.2) + 1.891 ∗ 0.25) − 0.2
= 0.16
(29)
The structural model predicts an increase in smoking probability of:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Φ(Φ−1(0.2) + 0.225 ∗ 0.25) − 0.2
= 0.016
and an increase in self-reported smoking probability of:
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.74 ∗ Φ(Φ−1(0.27) + 0.225 ∗ 0.25) − 0.2
= 0.014
41